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Advocacy for decentralization has grown in Mexico at a rapid pace during 
the last decade. The gains of decentralization, however, are rather unclear 
and many times the assumptions and the outcomes of the process depart 
from the standard theory of fiscal federalism. There are serious drawbacks 
that should be considered before fully endorsing any decentralization 
program. As decentralization has progressed in Mexico, for instance, it has 
become evident that most of Mexican states have incurred in large fiscal 
deficits, majorly due to excessive overspending. This paper explains the 
reasons why such a trend has been observed in recent years based on a 
simultaneous equation model of state revenues and expenditures. The results 
suggest that increases in fiscal deficits are significantly associated with more 
intense political competition at the subnational sphere, the stage of the 
political business cycle, and fiscal perversity caused by political 
decentralization. This implies that regions expect to be bailed out by the 
federal government in case of financial trouble and thus do not have an 
incentive to observe fiscal discipline. 
 




El impulso al proceso de descentralización en México se intensificó 
rápidamente durante la última década. Sin embargo, los beneficios de la 
descentralización son inciertos, y en numerosas ocasiones los supuestos y 
resultados del proceso departen de la teoría tradicional del federalismo fiscal. 
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Los procesos de descentralización presentan serias limitaciones que deben 
ser tomadas en cuenta antes de apoyar políticas que los favorezcan. Por 
ejemplo, mientras que la descentralización se consolidaba en México, era 
evidente que la mayoría de las entidades federativas incurrían en mayores 
déficit fiscales, principalmente ocasionado por un  excesivo gasto público. 
Con base en un modelo de ecuaciones simultáneas para el ingreso y gasto de 
las entidades federativas, este trabajo explica las razones por las cuales esta 
tendencia ha sido observada en años recientes. Los resultados sugieren que 
mayores déficit fiscales están estadísticamente asociados con mayor 
competencia política en la esfera subnacional, la fase del ciclo político de 
negocios, y la perversidad fiscal ocasionada por la descentralización política. 
Esto implica que las regiones esperan ser rescatadas por el gobierno federal 
en caso de encontrarse en problemas financieros y, por tanto, no tienen 
incentivos para observar disciplina fiscal. 
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Advocacy for decentralization has grown throughout the world in the last 
decade. Public policies and institutional political processes worldwide have 
been biased by multilateral organizations, among them the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, which tend to support decentralization 
processes with uncharacteristically strong and enthusiastic propaganda. Even 
though it is well documented that centralization, done badly, is the source of 
economic and social problems, the argument that intergovernmental agencies 
have always attempted to demolish the proposition for centralization is also 
valid; probably because it is considered a main source of corruption and 
inefficiency (World Bank, 2000). 
 
It is often claimed, and rightly so, that centralization is embedded with 
difficulties, both in nature and implementation. Conversely, decentralization 
appears as an advantageous scheme due to the more efficient provision of 
services and its contribution to strengthening democracies (Tiebout, 1956). 
In theory, decentralization, properly designed and implemented, certainly 
has an enormous potential to improve the efficiency of the public sector 
bureaucratic apparatus. Yet, in practice, the gains of decentralization are 
rather unclear and many times the assumptions and the outcomes of the 
process depart from the standard theory of fiscal federalism. Just like 
centralization is not a flawless process, there are serious drawbacks that 
should be considered before fully endorsing any decentralization program. 
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Full or “pure” decentralization has proved to be a theoretical panacea in 
the fiscal federalism theory (Tiebout, 1956). In its design stage, and usually 
in practice, nonetheless, decentralization lacks the clarity, transparency, 
stability and well-defined rules of the game that are paramount for its 
success (Prud’homme, 1995; Dabla-Norris, 2006). Mexico’s record, it will 
be evidenced, is a noticeable testimony that decentralization has failed to 
become the vivid panacea for public finance that Tiebout envisioned; rather, 
it is the opened Pandora’s box that unchained the evils of fiscal perversity of 
subnational governance. 
   
The conception of this paper emerges from the large fiscal deficits of the 
Mexican states, majorly due to excessive public spending. It determines how 
increasing political competition at the subnational sphere has affected the 
fiscal behavior of states and municipalities alike. My purpose here is not to 
characterize an ideal society, but rather to investigate how society is. Thus, 
the normative study of the assignment of responsibilities between the 
federal, state and local governments is beyond the scope of the present 
analysis. In this particular case, institutions should be regarded as given and 
hence the analysis should focus on their effect on the stats’ fiscal balances.  
 
For one to comprehend the fiscal behavior of the Mexican states, it is 
essential to acknowledge that their fiscal balances are heterogeneous, that is, 
fiscal deficits differ in magnitude amongst states. Based on the methodology 
of Velázquez (2002), and in order to analyze the specific political and 
economic factors that influence state fiscal behavior in Mexico, a 
simultaneous equation model of state revenues and expenditures using data 
from 1989 to 2005 will be estimated. It is not uncommon to find in the 
public policy and fiscal literatures numerous attempts to determine the 
sources of revenues, expenditures and fiscal crises. Research, however, has 
failed to investigate the subnational component, particularly the role that 
politics plays in the fiscal behavior of states and municipalities (Calsamiglia, 
X. et al., 2004).  
 
Two relevant reasons become apparent for the study of fiscal behavior at 
the local and state levels: first, Mexico is under an ongoing decentralization 
process (World Bank, 2000), and second, state fiscal deficits exert pressure 
on the federal government (Prud’homme, 1995). In the last two decades, 
decentralization in Mexico may be characterized as a process beginning in 
the earlier 1990s with the implementation of Solidaridad’s Municipal Funds 
for local project developments, under the administration of Carlos Salinas 
De Gortari. The consolidation stage of Mexican decentralization efforts, 
however, took place under the “New Federalism” agenda of Ernesto Zedillo, 
which aimed to increase the amount of federal revenue allocated to state 
governments, reform the health sector to give states new responsibilities in 
terms of medical services, continue the Solidaridad Municipal Funds (now Ensayos  92 
known as Municipal Social Development Funds), and give municipalities 
resources for the creation of social infrastructure, education, and health after 
the creation of a new law for fiscal coordination in 1997, which created the 
well-known Category 33 of the national budget
2. In 2000, the regulatory role 
and policymaking autonomy of the local governments was strengthened after 
an amendment of the Article 115 of the Constitution. The Fox administration 
continued to support decentralization, and implemented his so-called 
Program for Authentic Federalism, aiming to improve intergovernmental 
relations and increase transfers to local governments, given the 
commencement of a true political liberalization process (Grindle, 2007).       
 
A typical phenomenon observed mainly in less developed federative 
systems is the unbalance between revenue and expenditures of the 
subnational governments. Needless to say, in the long term, such imbalances 
may generate fiscally troublesome adjustments and affect national 
macroeconomic stability (Dabla-Norris, 2006). Prud’homme (1995) provides 
a good illustration of the effects of large state deficits in Argentina, Brazil 
and former Yugoslavia. Mexico is not immune to large state fiscal deficits, 
yet it should be acknowledged that, at least for now, state fiscal deficits in 
Mexico do not threat the national macroeconomic management because their 
share in the portfolio of the financial system is still relatively small (Giugale, 
Hernández Trillo, and Oliveira, 2000).  
 
The 1980s were a period of fiscal stability (World Bank, 2000). Yet, 
from 1989, state fiscal deficits rose significantly. A few years later, the crisis 
of 1994-1996 further increased them. In fact, from 1989 to 1996, per capita 
state fiscal deficits (in 2002 Mexican pesos) grew in average 10,195 percent. 
This can be translated into an annual rate of 66 percent.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: first, a succinct descriptive fiscal 
analysis of the Mexican states is presented. From this analysis, two 
important conclusions can be drawn: on the one hand, the last decade has 
been one of large increases in state fiscal deficits; on the other hand, 
Mexican states have proven to show divergent fiscal trends. The second 
section reviews the current literature on fiscal imbalances.  In the third 
section, an empirical model of fiscal behavior of the Mexican states will be 
constructed, based on political-economy determinants of fiscal behavior at 






2 Through the Category 33 (Ramo 33) mechanism, the federal government committed to 
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1.  Fiscal Deficits in the Mexican States: an Increasing Trend 
 
Starting in the earlier 1990s, Mexican states experienced large fiscal deficits 
after a period of relative stability (World Bank, 2000; Velázquez, 2002). 
Furthermore, the Mexican states reached in 2001 their worse financial 
situation to record. Graph 1 shows that by 2001 the aggregate per capita 
deficit was 145 Mexican pesos, quite a different situation from 1989, where 
the aggregate per capita deficit was 77 cents. It is straightforward that 
expenditures during the 1990s grew at higher rates than revenues, while in 
1989 fiscal equilibrium was practically attained. Notice that due to the crisis 
of 1994-1996 skyrocketed state fiscal deficits. In fact, from 1989 to 1996, 
per capita state fiscal deficits in 2002 Mexican pesos grew in average 10,195 
percent, an annual rate of 66 percent. By 1996, the large amount of 
outstanding debt in 25 states (out of 32) led the federal government to carry 
out an emergency stabilization program. Hernández Trillo, Díaz Cayeros, 
and Gamboa González (2002a, p. 25) describe succinctly and accurately the 
timeline of events prior and after the emergency stabilization program: “by 
1994 many states were highly indebted. On average total debt represented 80 
percent of the total annual disposable income of the states. When the 
financial crisis of December 1994 erupted, interest rates more than 
quintupled, from a one-month Certificados de la Tesorería rate of 13.8 in 
November 1994 to 74.8 in April 1995, and subnational governments simply 
could not keep servicing their debts. This was partially due to a lack of 
financial instruments to absorb external shocks. At the same time, 
commercial banks were experiencing liquidity and capitalization problems. 
For these reasons, the federal government came under pressure from the 
states and commercial banks to provide a major bailout. As a result, the 
federal government implemented a program called Financial Strengthening 
Program for States (Programa de Fortalecimiento Financiero de los Estados, 
or PFFE). This program cost around 7 billion pesos in 1995, representing 
more than 17 percent of the transfers for the year and about 10 percent of 
non-contingent subnational government debt. This program continued until 
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Graph 1. Aggregate Revenues, Expenditures and Fiscal Balance of the 
Mexican States 
(2002 Mexican Pesos Per Capita) 
 
Source: The author, based on the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Information (Mexico) and Ministry of Finance of Mexico City. 




In Graph 2, aggregate state per-capita revenues in 2002 Mexican pesos 
are presented and broken down by own-source revenues and federal 
transfers. In general, according to the data, federal transfers grew faster than 
own-source revenues during the period of study. Note that after decreases in 
1990 and 1993, the ratio of federal transfers over total revenue increased 
from 55.4 percent in 1993 to 74.8 percent in 2005. Conversely, own-source 
revenue (state taxes, charges and fees) declined from 44.6 percent to 25.3 
percent, mainly due to a decline in tax collection. Tax collection as a 
percentage of total revenue decreased from 23.5 percent in 1993 to 12.2 
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Graph 2. Aggregate State Revenues  
(Absolute Values in 2002 Mexican Pesos),  
and Annual Per Capita Growth Rate 
 
 
Source: The author, based on the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Information (Mexico) and Ministry of Finance of Mexico City. 
 
A valid inquiry is to know whether this aggregate behavior was not 
driven by a few outlier states with excessively high fiscal expenditures. 
According to the data, this is not likely to be the case. In general, all states 
presented a similar evolution of their fiscal conditions. If the fiscal situation 
of states before and after the financial crisis of 1995 is compared, 26 of 32 
states presented more sound fiscal balances in the period 1989-1995 than in 
the period 1996-2005. Similarly, Velázquez (2002) shows that the fiscal 
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Understanding the differences in fiscal behavior amongst states is 
necessary in order to make sense of the fiscal model to be introduced in the 
next section and comprehend the effect of state revenues and expenditures. 
From Table 1, differences at the subnational are clear: whereas some states 
exhibit large deficits, others have shown fairly sustained, albeit rather 
modest, surpluses. Notice that fiscal behavior has become more divergent 
over time, as reflected by larger standard deviations. For instance, whereas in 
2005 the state of Quintana Roo had a fiscal surplus of over 113 pesos per 
capita, the Federal District had an outstanding fiscal deficit of 664 Mexican 
pesos per capita. Likewise, whereas the standard deviation of fiscal balances 
was of 1.58 pesos in 1989, in 2005 it rose to almost 150 pesos. 
 
 
2.  Fiscal Perversity  
 
Fiscal behavior, both at the national and subnational scales, has been studied 
to detail in the economic and sociopolitical literatures. Yet, due to the 
persistent state and local fiscal crises that have taken place in developing 
countries, a new body of literature has emerged in the last few years focusing 
on what is defined as “fiscal perversity”. A region is said to be “fiscally 
perverse” when it expects to be bailed out by the federal government in case 
of financial trouble.  Dabla-Norris (2006), Hernández Trillo, Díaz Cayeros, 
and Gamboa González (2002a), and Prud’homme (1995) point out that states 
do not have an incentive to observe fiscal discipline once they know that the 
federal government will rescue them in case of debt default.  
 
Two phenomena may explain why Mexican states are likely to be 
fiscally perverse. On the one hand, the Mexican Fiscal Coordination Act 
forces the federal government to absorb potential debt of federative entities 
via transfer deductions (Fiscal Coordination Act, 2006, Giugale, Hernández 
Trillo, and Oliveira, 2000)
3. In other words, as Velázquez (2002) points out, 
“if a state cannot pay its debt, the lender bank just has to tell the federal 
government [which] will deduct from the federal transfers of that state the 
amount necessary to pay the debt. Thus contrary to the normal case where 
borrowers get out of the credit market if they repudiate their debt, states in 
Mexico do not suffer from this consequence since the banks always 
recuperate their money”. On the other hand, the Fiscal Code, among other 
fiscal laws, forces the federal government to give additional transfers to 
states in budget trouble (as in years 1994-1996; see Graph 2) instead of 
punishing them for defaulting on their debt (Fiscal Code, 2007)
4. As pointed 
                                                            
3 Congress of the Union, Ley de Coordinación Fiscal (last update as of December 27, 
2006), http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/31.pdf.  
4 Congress of the Union, Código Fiscal de la Federación (last update as of January 30, 
2007), http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/8.pdf.  Ensayos  98 
out before, in Mexico federal transfers represent over 70 percent of state 
revenues (approximately 75 percent in 2005) and thus are fiscally relevant 
for the states’ expenditures (see Graph 2).    
 
Now I proceed to define the major political and economic drivers of the 
divergent fiscal behaviors observed in Table 1.  
  
2.1.  Political Determinants of State Fiscal Deficits 
 
As pointed out by Prud’homme (1995), those politicians that are not able to 
secure the election and face strong political competition are more often than 
not induced to surpass the limits of conscious public spending and misuse 
the budget for propagandistic purposes. Another recent political 
phenomenon to factor in, which is probably more idiosyncratic to the 
Mexican experience, is that after the Zedillo administration, the 
intergovernmental power relation changed. Today state governors are not as 
intensively scrutinized by or subject to the president (Velázquez, 2002).    
 
In the last decade, elected governors have emerged from their own local 
or state political institutions, rather than from the Mexico City political 
scene. As Hernández Trillo, Díaz Cayeros, and Gamboa González (2002b) 
state, “the relative importance of local politicians, especially governors, has 
reshaped the financial relationship between the federal and state 
governments, weakening local fiscal discipline and increasing the likelihood 
of federal bailouts”. This phenomenon became more recurrent once that 
major political parties opened their candidate nomination processes to the 
public in fairly democratic conventions. In contrast, two or three decades ago 
they were designated by “dedazo”, or the point-fingering of the candidate. 
The term is symbolic, referring to the Institutional Revolutionary Party's 
tradition of allowing the incumbent president to appoint the nominees for 
state governorships, whereas voters were not allowed to take part in the 
nomination of any party's contender.  
 
Cornelius (1996) points out that political parties realized that local 
candidates, because of their local knowledge and their more local support 
and regionalism, are more likely to win the election than dedazo candidates. 
Logically, this type of “local” governor does not entirely owe its position to 
the president, so as a consequence she is more independent from the center 
and more responsive to her constituency than to the president. Hence, 
assuming expenditures and taxes affect the well-being of citizens, a local 
governor will be more prone to run deficits if the fiscal federal system allows 
it. Also, state governors may promote excessive public spending given that 
they have more economic and political interests within the state. It is 
difficult to avoid a governor belonging to a prominent local elite from 
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state governors who need to secure their position within the élite are often 
pushed to condone taxes or other payments to friends and allies. It is also 
true that state governors are likely to use expenditures to gain political 
support within their elite (Velázquez, 2002).  
 
Fiscal deficits are also explained by the political business. The political 
business cycle is an alternative theory stating that when an administration of 
any hue is elected, it initially adopts a contractionary policy to reduce 
spending and gain a reputation for economic competence. It then adopts an 
expansionary policy in the lead up to the next election, hoping to achieve 
simultaneously growth in new infrastructure and low unemployment on 
Election Day. In Guerrero Compeán (2005), I concluded that political 
business cycles do exist at the state level in Mexico. In particular, I found 
that spending cuts and tax increases are smaller when state governments are 
about to stand for elections. I also showed that if opposition parties are very 
likely to win, state governments tend to increase their spending and thus 
incur in fiscal deficits. This logic is reflected by the data: after 1992, the year 
when decentralization started to gain momentum, fiscal deficits soared, and 
from 1997 to 1999, prior to the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s electoral 
debacle and when political competition was severe, they grew at an even 
faster pace (Graphic 1).   
 
2.2.  Economic Determinants of State Fiscal Deficits 
 
Economic factors also account for state fiscal deficits (Prud’homme, 1995). 
Of these factors, by far the most important are the economic characteristics 
of the states; variables such as per capita income, federal transfers, 
employment, federal public investment and transfers affect directly state 
revenues and expenditures. Likewise, Dabla-Norris (2006) also notes that 
demographic factors may affect the fiscal system. Yet, demography seems 
less relevant in the case of Mexico for the time horizon considered here, as 
states do not provide many public services and large welfare programs are 
controlled by the federal government. It should be pointed out, however, that 
large cities in Mexico have expanded their spending in public services over 
the past decade. The following is an explanation of the economic variables to 
affect the fiscal system.  
 
Higher per capita incomes imply larger revenues. The richer the people, 
the larger the tax base for state governments. The mechanics is rather simple. 
As discussed by Netzer (2003), wealthier people usually demand more and 
better public services. If so, this theorizes that such people would agree to 
have their taxes increased to finance the improved supply of services. 
 
Federal transfers affect both total revenues and own-source state 
revenue, yet they are exogenous because they do not depend on the fiscal Ensayos  100 
behavior of the state in question. Prud’homme (1995) and other scholars 
claim that federal transfers reduce the incentives of state governments to 
collect taxes and revenue. Similarly, federal transfers also affect 
expenditures. More federal transfers increase the resources to spend. In a 
country like Mexico where transfers represent over 70 percent of state 
revenue (Graph 2), this is an important factor.  
 
Employment rates also affect the economic system. High unemployment 
is translated into fewer taxes collected. Velázquez (2002) underscores that in 
Mexico there is no unemployment insurance, nor large welfare benefits at 
the state level (the few welfare programs in Mexico’s history like 
Solidaridad or Oportunidades are federal initiatives), thus employment does 
not directly affect expenditures  as it may be in the United States  but it 
may reduce revenues.  
 
Federal public investment affects state expenditures in two opposite 
ways. First, a crowding-out effect is observed because federal public 
investment may reduce the need of using state resources. Conversely, federal 
public investment generates a crowding-in effect because federal public 
spending may stimulate state expenditures by augmenting the marginal 
productivity of such state expenditures (Rodden et al., 2003). 
 
Another variable that also accounts for state fiscal deficits is the interest 
rate (World Bank, 2000). Needless to say, this is a variable that does not 
vary across states. It tries to reflect the stance of the national economy and it 
serves to control for changes that affected all states through time, i.e., the 
financial crisis of 1995. Low interest rates should induce more public 
spending since it is less costly to get credit and projects become more 
profitable. Moreover, this variable is a proxy for the economic conditions at 
the national level, which might affect state behavior by changing the 
perception of subnational governments about possible bailouts by the federal 
government (Velázquez, 2002).   
 
 
3.  An Econometric Analysis of Fiscal Deficits 
 
This section is based on the empirical analyses of the public expenditure 
decisions in large U.S. cities and the Mexican regions carried out by Hu and 
Booms (1971) and Velázquez (2002), respectively. Yet, whereas Hu and 
Booms (1971) carry out a cross-section analysis, I use a panel data 
framework. Likewise, Velázquez’s (2002) analysis covers the period 1983-
1992; whereas I focus on a most recent and probably more interesting time 
period, that of 1989-2005, when decentralization policies are already in 
action. My analysis consists of a simultaneous equation model of revenues Decentralization: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?  Fiscal Perversity in Mexico  101 
and expenditures with state individual data from 1989 to 2005, the last year 
with data available at the state level.  
 
Assume that state i in each period t spends   collects   and borrows 
 thus satisfying the budget constraint: 
 
       ( 1 )  
 
where F are federal transfers. The state i maximizes its utility based on the 
following function: 
 
     (2) 
 
Where X and Y are vectors representing exogenous variables affecting 
expenditures and revenues, respectively, and   is a vector that captures 
institutional and political variables. In each period t, the state maximizes U 
subject to the budget constraint in Equation (1). The optimization process 
yields reduced-form functions for    and   
  Borrowing is determined once spending and 
revenues are chosen (Velázquez, 2002). This produces the following 
simultaneous equation model of revenues and expenditures: 
 
 
  (3) 
 
 
  (4) 
 
 
 is per capita income in 2002 Mexican pesos for state i in year t. For 
the period 1993-2005, the data were obtained from the National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography and Information of Mexico online database. Official 
state gross domestic product (GDP) estimations do not exist for the period 
1989-1992. Yet, Germán-Soto (2005) derived state GDP estimates for the 
period 1940-1992 based on the sensibility coefficient of an ordinary least-
squares regression adjusted by a cross-section conciliation method. I used his 
estimations for years 1989-1992.  
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r  is the inflation-adjusted three-month Certificados de la Tesorería 
interest rate. This rate is the monthly average rate of three-month Federal 
Treasury bills.  Notice that given this is a national variable,   
 
,   and   are federal transfers to the states, state fiscal balance and 
federal public investment in the states for state i in year t, respectively. These 
data were used in per capita terms and were obtained from the National 
System of Municipal and State Databases. As mentioned before, it is claimed 
that federal transfers reduce the incentives of the local government to collect 
revenue. A negative coefficient would confirm this idea. Similarly, a 
negative (positive) previous-year-fiscal-balance coefficient in the 
expenditure (revenue) equation would mean that states do not adjust for the 
previous fiscal balance. Finally, a positive sign in the federal public 
investment coefficient would mean that federal public investment induces 
more state expenditures.  
 
 is formal employment for state i in year t. All state-level data on 
formal employment are from the Ministry of Labor.  
 
 is a set of dummy variables that measures how local or central a 
governor is. Following the same classification used by Velázquez (2002), I 
classified governors as “very local”, “local”, “central” and “very central”
5. 
The variable can take the values of 0, 1, 2 and 3. A governor who never had 
a public position in the state or local level is classified as “very central” and 
has the value of 0. Governors who were federal congressmen once or worked 
less than six years at the state or local level had a mark of 1. Governors who 
occupied any kind of state or local public host for at least six years in 
addition to federal positions received a value of 2. Finally, governors whose 
public positions were all at the state or local level had a 3. This variable was 
constructed by reviewing the biographies of the governors. The main source 
of information was the government website e-local, www.e-local.gob.mx, 
which contains information for all the states and municipalities of Mexico 
                                                            
5 This variable is a proxy for political decentralization. Often analysts claim that other 
proxies for political decentralization may include the relationship between the political 
affiliation of governors and the president, or whether the majority of the state congress 
belongs to the governor’s political party. However, both proxies present deficiencies. The 
first proxy assumes that decentralization should be defined in terms of party favoritism. 
Even though such favoritisms have been observed in the Mexican political arena more 
often than not, such a proxy is limited in that it is unable to capture the effect of the 
governors’ background, which is associated to political decentralization and fiscal 
perversity. As previously discussed, state governors may promote excessive public 
spending if they have more economic and political interests within the state. The second 
proxy fails to capture the interaction between the center and the state, which is by all 
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for at least 40 years. The information obtained from e-local was 
complemented with information from the states’ official government and 
transparency websites.       
 
 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there were elections for 
governor in the year of analysis. This variable was constructed by the author 
with information from the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico online 
databases.   represents the Molinar index of political competition for state 
i in year t (Molinar, 1991). Designed for cases where there is a dominant 
party like the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, the Molinar index 
does not overstate the size of the largest party or the relevance of small 
parties. Mathematically, the Molinar index, or   where 
 is the sum of major political parties and   is the sum of all 
minority parties (Molinar, 1991). A higher index means more political 
competition.   
The vectors   and   are sets of fixed effects. Except for 
Aguascalientes, which is the base state, there is one fixed effect for each 
state.  
 
This model establishes that own-source revenues depend on 
expenditures, per capita income, federal transfers, employment, the fiscal 
balance of the previous year, and the political variables. Likewise, the model 
establishes that expenditures depend, in addition to the political variables, on 
revenues, the interest rate, federal public investment, federal transfers and 
the balance of the previous year.  
 
In order to estimate the effect of these variables on the states’ fiscal 
balance, it is necessary to look at their complete effects on revenues and 
expenditures. In other words, it is necessary to look at the reduced form of 
equations (3) and (4). Algebraically, 
 
 
    (5) 
 
    (6) 
 
 







and   
 
 
Once again, i  refers to the different Mexican states, t  refers to the 
different years of the sample, R is per capita own-source revenues of the 
states in 2002 Mexican pesos, and E is per capita expenditures excluding 
debt-related expenditures. 
 
3.1.  Main Findings  
 
I estimated the parameters of equations (3) and (4) by Three-Stage Least-
Squares (3SLS). I used 3SLS because it provides consistent estimates for 
linear regression models with explanatory variables correlated with the error 
term, as is the case. 3SLS extends ordinary least squares analysis to estimate 
system of linear equations with correlated error terms. Given the cross-
equation logical covariation, 3SLS possess greater efficiency than Two-
Stage Least-Squares (Belsey, 1988). The results of this model are in Table 3. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Revenue  818.37 873.99  20.29  2,483.36 
Expenditures  878.96 905.38  21.06  2,576.75 
Deficit  -60.59 51.5  -145.22 -0.77 
Income  13,696.65 952.81  12,338.61  15,434.02 
Federal transfers  654.01 693.65  13.09 1926.02 
Employment  0.14 0.06  0.11  0.17 
Federal public investment  0.03 0.06  0.08  0.31 
Interest rate  0.21 0.13  0.05  0.72 
Political competition  1.89 0.76  0.02  3.12 
Source: The author, based on the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Information (Mexico), Ministry of Finance of Mexico City, Ministry of Labor, 
National System of Municipal Databases, and the Bank of Mexico. 
Note: Revenues, expenditures, the balance, income, federal transfers and federal 
public investment are expressed in 2002 Mexican pesos in per capita terms. 
Employment and interest rates are expressed in percentages. 
 
3.1.1.  Revenue Equation 
 
The results of the analysis reinforce the findings of and Booms (1971) and 
Velázquez (2002). Per capita income, as expected, has a positive influence 
on revenues. An increase of one standard deviation of per capita income 
(952.81 Mexican pesos; see Table 2) produces 170.22 more pesos per capita 
in revenue (see non-reduced revenue equation in Table 3). The coefficient of 
federal transfers is negative and significant. This in turn reflects that an 
expansion of federal transfers is associated with a disincentive to state 
governments to collect taxes. The analysis shows that a one-standard-
deviation increase in federal transfers to states is associated with a decline in 
revenues of 3,428.92 pesos per capita. This evidences that increasing federal 
transfers is not the optimal policy to reduce state fiscal deficits. As 
mentioned above, this analysis presents similar findings to those in of 
Velázquez (2002). On the one hand, it has been concluded that the 
coefficient of the previous year’s fiscal balance is positive, yet not 
statistically different from zero. This means that revenues do not adjust for 
last year’s fiscal results. On the other hand, the political variables present the 
correct sign and magnitude but they are not statistically significant at the 
usual levels. These results suggest that reducing state taxes or fees are not 
political strategies to get votes (Velázquez, 2002). 
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3.1.2.  Expenditure Equation 
 
The coefficient of revenues is positive, and so is the transfers coefficient. 
The coefficient of federal public investment is positive, meaning that federal 
expenditures do not generate a crowding-out effect. Conversely, from the 
estimated regression notice that current expenditures do not adjust to last 
year’s balance. The interest-rate coefficient is negative and significant. 
Given the variability of the interest rates throughout the period of study, one 
should not be deceived by the apparently small coefficient (Interest rates 
ranged from 158 percent in January 1988 to 7.8 per cent in January 2006, 
according to the Banco de México). In fact, the real effect of interest rates is 
likely to help explain the increase in expenditures. Velázquez (2002) argues 
that “we observe high state fiscal deficits in situations where economic 
conditions are better, and sounder state fiscal conditions when the economy 
is not at its best. Hence, low interest rates and low inflation may have 
decreased the cost of possible bailouts, changing state expectations about 
them”.   
 
In terms of the political variables, the “central governor” variable 
coefficient is not significant, meaning there is no difference in the behavior 
of central and very central governors. In contrast, the “local governor” 
variable is positive and significant. This type of governor spends 2.96 pesos 
per capita more than very central governors, the base case. The “very local 
governor” coefficient is also positive and significant. A very local governor 
spends 3.48 pesos per capita more than very central governors. Similarly, the 
coefficient of the political competition variable is also positive and 
significant. The coefficient of the state election variable is positive and 
significant. In election years, state expenditures are increased by 2.30 pesos 
per capita. This shows that expenditures are used as an instrument to get 
votes. This was already evidenced in Guerrero Compeán (2005). 
 
3.1.3.  Deficit Equation 
 
Table 3 presents the coefficients for the deficit equation. The first result is 
that higher per capita incomes are associated with smaller fiscal deficits. A 
one-standard deviation increase in per capita income is associated with a 
92.41 pesos-per-capita reduction of the fiscal deficit. In addition, an 
expansion of the federal transfers is associated with larger deficits. A one-
standard deviation increase in federal transfers produces a decrease in the 
balance of 8,440.35 pesos per capita. Increases in the interest rates are 
associated with improvements in fiscal behavior: a one-standard deviation 
increase in interest rates reduces the deficit by 0.004 pesos per capita. States 
with local and very local governors exhibited larger per capita deficits (2.38 
and 5.91 pesos per capita, respectively) than states ruled by very central 
governors. Notice that political competition is associated with larger deficits. Decentralization: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?  Fiscal Perversity in Mexico  107 
A one-standard deviation increase in the index of political competition is 
followed by a decline in the fiscal balance of 1.29 pesos per capita.  
 
Table 3. Three-Stage Least-Squares Estimation for the Revenue and 














Expenditures  9.6354      
  (0.003)     
Revenue   9.6589     
   (0.000)     
Income  0.1787   0.3586  0.2616 
  (0.002)   (0.003)  (0.002) 
Federal Transfers  -5.2429 14.8899  11.1916 23.3596 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Employment  -0.4683   0.9189  -0.6459 
  (0.097)     
Lagged balance  3.7609 -6.0308  -0.8006 -6.1169 
  (0.123) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Central governor  -0.3219 0.1765  -0.4175  -0.1212 
  (0.076) (0.099)  (0.096) (0.088) 
Local governor  -2.3831 2.9550  -1.0804 2.3798 
  (0.097) (0.025)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Very local governor  -5.0778 6.4394  -1.0957 5.9063 
  (0.062) (0.010)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Political competition  -1.3236 1.5453  -0.4710 1.2272 
  (0.183) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.011) 
Elections  -1.5843 1.2168  -1.1502 0.3370 
  (0.196) (0.043)  (0.002) (0.004) 
Interest rate   -0.0145  -0.0216 -0.0524 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Federal public 
investment   1.0093     
   (0.099)     
3SLS System  
R squared 
0.618 
N  544 544  544 544 
 
 
Source: The author, based on the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Information (Mexico), Ministry of Finance of Mexico City, Ministry of Labor, National 
System of Municipal Databases, and the Bank of Mexico. 
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Table 4. Effects on State Fiscal Balances, Based on  
a Three-Stage Least-Squares Estimation 
 
Variable Revenues  Expenditures  Balance 
Income  341.701 249.286  92.415 
Interest rate  -0.003 -0.007  0.004 
Federal transfers  7,763.029 16,203.380  -8,440.351 
Local governor  0.000 2.380  -2.380 
Very local governor  0.000 5.906  -5.906 
Political competition  -0.358 0.933  -1.291 
Source: The author, based on the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Information (Mexico), Ministry of Finance of Mexico City, Ministry of Labor, National 
System of Municipal Databases, and the Bank of Mexico. 
 
 
Conclusion       
 
This paper concerns state fiscal deficits in Mexico during the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s. Its goal is to show the dangers of decentralization in 
practice. Through this analysis, we demonstrated that Prud’homme’s fears 
are real and indeed occur in developing countries like Mexico. From the 
analysis, it can be concluded that the decentralization process in Mexico 
jeopardizes fiscal stability and is often accompanied by state budget misuse 
and other corruption practices. The results of the simultaneous equation 
analysis suggest that fiscal behavior is negatively affected (i.e., fiscal deficits 
are likely) when political competition exists due to overspending. This 
association is reinforced in election years. 
 
Also, the analysis shows that decentralization leads to fiscal perversity 
practices. States ruled by so-called “very local” governors exhibit larger 
deficits. Similarly, states receiving more federal transfers seem to collect 
fewer taxes, thus showing larger deficits. As shown by the interest rate 
coefficient, a proxy for good national economic conditions, economic 
bonanza is associated with larger fiscal deficits due to overspending. This is 
so because states expect to be bailed out by the federal government in good 
economic times, but not in bad (Velázquez, 2002). 
 
This analysis is a contribution to the fiscal policy and public economics 
literatures in that it was evidenced that the decentralization process in 
Mexico is associated with state fiscal misbehavior and debt. 
Decentralization, notwithstanding, is an unlikely irreversible process, and the 
trend for the short and medium term is that states, for political purposes and 
ideological agenda, will gain more autonomy from the center. Thus, legal 
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and regional economic instability. The modification of the Article 9 of the 
Fiscal Coordination Act in 1997 to induce market discipline and avoid future 
bailouts along with the regulatory framework for subnational debt 
management enforced in 2000 were a necessary, albeit insufficient, step in 
the right direction. Further amendments to the Fiscal Coordination Act and 
the Mexican Fiscal Code, among other regulations, seem thus advisable. 
Other practices, such as limiting the borrower’s maximum debt-service ratio 
and level of total indebtedness, as well as limiting banks’ portfolio exposure 
to the public sector and passing and regulating public entity bankruptcy and 
fiscal accountability laws, are also much needed (Giugale, Hernández Trillo, 
and Oliveira, 2000).  
 
Another relevant point to consider when assessing the expansion of the 
decentralization process in Mexico is related to the views of Prud’homme 
(1995) and Tanzi (1995), who argue that bureaucrats at the subnational 
levels are likely to be more corrupt than those of the center given that fewer 
people keep track of their actions and proceedings. Velázquez (2002) argues 
that politics at the local level may still be dominated by caciques and élite-
influenced decision-making processes. This is particularly relevant for the 
rural regions of Mexico and deserves further study. It should be then 
emphasized that the analysis presented here concluded that states presided 
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